Rupert:
The answer to some of your questions...
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INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON
INVESTIGATION NO. 2988
CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT AT
NAPERVILLE, ILL., ON APRIL 26, 1946
Inv-2988
SUMMARY
Railroad: Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy
Date: April 25, 1946
Location: Naperville, Ill.
Kind of accident: Rear-end collision
Trains involved: Passenger:
Passenger
Train numbers: 11:
39
Engine numbers: Diesel-electric units 9920 A
and 9920 B: Diesel-electric units 9910 A and 9910 B
Consist: 13 cars:
9 cars
Estimated speed: Standing:
45 m.p.h.
Operation: Signal indications
Tracks: Three; tangent; 0.24
percent descending grade westward
Weather: Clear
Time: 1:05 p.m.
Casualties: 45 killed; 69 injured
Cause: Failure to operate
following train in accordance with signal indications
Recommendation: That the Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Railroad Company discontinue the operation of passenger train
cars which do not
meet present standards, intermingled in trains with cars meeting
such standards
Consideration
of method for controlling speed deferred pending disposition of Docket No. 29543
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
INVESTIGATION NO. 2988
IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPOTS UNDER THE ACCIDENT
REPORTS ACT CF MAY 6, 1910.
CHICAGO BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY
July 30, 1946.
Accident at Naperville, Ill., on April 25, 1946, caused by failure to operate
the following train in accordance with signal indications.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 1
PATTERSON, Commissioner:
On April 25, 1946, there were a rear-end collision between two passenger trains
on the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad at Naperville, Ill., which
resulted in the death of 39 passengers, 4 dinning-car employees, 1 employee off
duty and 1 train-service employee, and the injury of 48 passengers, 1 porter,
19 dining-car employees and 1 train service employee. This accident was
investigated in conjunction with representatives of the Illinois Commerce
Commission.
Diagram
Inv. No. 2988 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Naperville, Ill. April 25,
1946.
Location of Accident and Method of Operation
This accident occurred on that part, of the Chicago Division extending between
Roosevelt Road, Chicago, and Eola, Ill., 32 57 miles, a three-track line in the
vicinity of the point of accident. The main tracks are designated from north to
south as Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Trains moving in either direction on tracks Nos. 1
and 2 and east-bound trains moving on track No. 3 are operated by signal
indications. The accident occurred on track No. 2 at a point 1,097 feet east of
the station at Naperville, 26.94 miles west of Roosevelt Road. From the east
there are, in succession, a tangent 4,732 feet in length, a compound curve to
the right 4,160 feet, the maximum curvature of which is 0 degree 49.12', and a
tangent 1,850 feet to the point of accident and 4.20 miles westward. The grade
for west-bound trains on track No. 2 varies between 0.014 and 0.10 percent
descending 3,400 feet, practically level 1,900 feet, 0.60 percent ascending
about 1,800 feet, then it varies between 0.11 and 0.27 percent descending 1,813
feet to the point of accident, where it is
0.24 percent.
Automatic signals 227.1 and 228.1, governing west-bound movements on track No.
2, are mounted on signal bridges located, respectively, 6,581 feet and 934 feet
east of the point of accident. These signals are of the three-indication,
color-light type, and are continuously lighted. The yellow aspect of signal 227
1 is 27 41 feet above the level of the tops of the rails and 3.53 feet north of
the center-line of track No. 2. The red aspect of signal 228.1 is 21.89 feet
above the level of the tops of the rails and 6.5 feet north of the center-line
of track No. 2. The involved aspects and corresponding indications and names of
these signals are as follows:
Signal Aspect
Indication Name
227.1 Yellow
APPROACH NEXT SIGNAL Approach-Signal
PREPARED TO STOP
228.1 Red
STOP; THEN PROCEED Stop and Proceed
Signal
The controlling circuits of these signals are so arranged that, when a train is
occupying track No. 2 in the block between signal 228.1 and the next signal
westward, signal 227.1 displays approach-next-signal-prepared-to-stop, and
signal 228.1 displays stop-then-proceed.
Operating rules read in part as follows:
DEFINITIONS
* * *
Restricted Speed. --Proceed prepared to stop snort of train, obstruction, or
anything that may require the speed of a train to be reduced.
11. A train finding a
fusee burning op or near its track must stop and extinguish the fusee, and then
proceed at restricted speed.
14. ENGINE WHISTLE
SIGNALS.
Note. --The signals prescribed are illustrated by "o" for short sounds; "--"
for loaner sounds.
* * *
SOUND.
INDICATION.
* * *
(c) ----- o o o Flagman protect rear
of train.
* * *
35. The following
signals will be used by flagmen:
Day signals-A red flag, Torpedoes and Fusees.
* * *
99. When a train
stops under circumstances in which it may be overtaken by another train, the
flagman must go back immediately with flagman's signals a sufficient distance
to insure full protection, placing two torpedoes, and when necessary, in
addition, displaying lighted fusses.
* * *
When a train is moving under circumstances in which it may be overtaken by
another train, the flagman must take such action as may be necessary to insure
full protection. 3 night, or by day when the view is obscured, lighted fusees
must be thrown off at proper intervals.
* * *
509. ***
* * *
When a train is stopped by a Stop and Proceed-signal it may proceed-
* * *
(B) On two or more
tracks at once at restricted speed, expecting to find a train in the block,
broken rail, obstruction or switch not properly lined.
Time-table special instructions read in part as follows:
1. When a distant
signal is displaying a restricting indication, trains must reduce speed at once
and move at "restricted speed" until the indication of the next governing
signal can be determined.
37. * * *
* * *
EMERGENCY RED REAR END LIGHTS. Trainmen on trains equipped with oscillating
emergency red rear end lights must familiarize themselves with the location of
the switches which control the lights and will be governed by the following.
* * *
To provide supplemental protection under Rule 99 in all circumstances where its
use is necessary to stop following trains on one or more tracks.
* * *
The use of this emergency red light does not in any way relieve the flagman
from flagman from full compliance with Rules 99. * * *.
* * *
The maximum authorized speed for the passenger trains involved was 80 miles per
hour.
Description of Accident
No. 11, a west-bound first-class passenger train, consisted of Diesel-electric
units 9920 A and 9920 B, one baggage car, one storage-mail car, two baggage
cars, one mail car, one refrigerator-express car, two baggage cars, two
coaches, one dining car, one parlor-lounge car and one, coach, in the order
named. The sixth car was of steel-underframe construction, the ninth to
eleventh-cars, inclusive, were of lightweight stainless-steel construction, and
the remainder of the cars were of conventional all-steel construction. This
train departed from Chicago Union Station, 28.44 miles east of Naperville, at
12:35 p.m., on time, and, moving on track No. 2, passed Downer's Grove, the
last open office, 7.32 miles east of Naperville, at 12:57 p.m., 1 minute late.
Soon afterward, some object was seen flying front beneath one of the cars and
the train was stopped at Naperville for inspection at 1:03 p.m., with the rear
end standing 1,097 feet east of the station. About 2 minutes later the rear end
was struck by No. 39.
No. 39, a west-bound first-class passenger train, consisted of Diesel-electric
units 9910 A and 9910 B, coupled in multiple control, three coaches, one dining
car, two tourist sleeping cars and three Pullman sleeping cars, in the order
named. All cars were of steel construction. This train departed from Chicago
Union Station at 12:35 p.m., on time, and moved on track No. 1 to Kedzie
Avenue, 23.59 miles east of Naperville, then entered track No. 2, passed
Downer's Grove at 1 p.m., 2 minutes late, passed signal 227.1, which displayed
approach-next-signal-prepared-to-stop, passed signal 228.1, which displayed
stop-then-proceed, passed the flagman of No. 11, and while moving at an
estimated speed of not less than 45 miles per hour it collided with No. 11 at a
point 934 feet west of signal 228.1.
The ninth car of No. 11 was derailed and leaned to the south at an angle of 15
degrees, but remained in line with track No. 2. The center-sill was twisted and
the roof sheets and the end sheets were somewhat damaged. The tenth car stopped
on its left side south of track No. 2 and at an angle of 15 degrees to it. Both
ends were buckled, the center-sill and cross members were bent, both draft
gears were broken and both trucks were damaged. The eleventh car was turned
around, bent into an U-shape, stopped north of the tenth car and against it,
and was demolished about three-fourths of its length. The knuckle of the front
coupler and the shank of the rear coupler were broken. The twelfth car was
derailed across track No. 1 and stopped with its front end about 10 feet west
of the tenth cur and leaned to the north at an angle of 25 degrees. Both draft
gears were broken, and both trucks were badly damaged. The front unit of engine
9910 entered the rear car of No. 11 above the floor-line and demolished the
superstructure of this car about three-fourths its length. This car remained
upright on track No. 2, and at the rear of the eleventh and twelfth cars The
center-sill at the rear end was bent downward about 18 inches; the bend
extended to the rear bolster. Both units of Diesel-electric engine 9910, of No.
39, were derailed but remained upright and in line with track No. 2. The front
unit of this engine stopped inside the rear car No. 11 at a point 205 feet west
of the point of collision. The front truck was torn off and stopped 18 feet
west of the point of collision. The frames, the trucks, and the electrical and
air equipment of both units were badly damaged. The first to fourth cars,
inclusive, and the rear truck of the fifth car of No. 39 were derailed. This
equipment remained, upright and in line with track No. 2. The rear end of the
second car telescoped the front end of the third car about 6 feet. The derailed
cars of No. 39 were damaged, but not extensively.
The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred about 1:05
p.m.
The fireman of No. 39, who jumped from the engine just before the collision
occurred, was killed. The engineer of No. 39 was injured.
According to data furnished by the railroad, the weight of the equipment of No,
39 was 1,043.04 tons. The ninth to eleventh cars, inclusive, of No. 11 were of
lightweight stainless-steel construction. The twelfth and thirteenth cars of
No. 11 were of conventional all-steel, plate, girder, post and sill
construction. The ninth and tenth cars were built in 1940, the eleventh car, in
1938, and the twelfth and thirteenth cars, in 1918.
Diesel-electric engine 9910 is provided with M-40-A brake equipment. A
safety-control feature is so arranged that when there is no pressure exerted or
either the foot pedal or the automatic brake-valve handle, the train brakes
will be applied in emergency, unless a brake application of 30 pounds
brake-cylinder pressure has been made. To apply the train-brake system in
emergency by manual operation, the brake-valve handle must be moved to the
extreme right of the brake-valve quadrant. The equipment is so arranged that
during an emergency application of the brakes sand is automatically deposited
upon the rails. The regulating devices were adjusted for brake-pipe pressure of
110 pounds and main-reservoir pressure of 140 pounds. Of the cars of No. 39,
four were equipped with UC-12-3 control valves, and five with LN-3 control
valves. Both units of the Diesel-electric engine and 6 cars were equipped with
clasp brakes, and the other cars were equipped with one brake shoe per wheel.
After the accident, tests of the air-brake equipment of No. 39 disclosed that
the automatic brake valve and all control valves of the units involved
functioned as intended, both in service and in emergency applications. The
brake-cylinder piston travel of the nine cars varied between 6-1/2 and 9-1/4
inches. The piston travel of one car only was in excess of 9 inches.
A few days after the accident a series of braking tests was conducted with a
train comparable in weight, braking ratios, and consist to that of No. 39 on
the day of the accident. During one test a speed of 81 miles per hour was
attained and a 30-pound brake-pipe reduction, which was initiated at signal
227.1, stopped the train at a point 33 feet east of signal 228.1. During the
next test, a speed of 85 miles per hour was attained and a 30-pound brake-pipe
reduction, which was initiated at signal 227.1, stopped the train at a point 33
feet east of signal 228.1. During another test, an emergency application made
at a point 2.202 feet east of signal can be obtained, stopped the train from a
speed of 86 miles per hour in a distance of 3,529 feet, at a point 1,327 feet
west of signal 228.1 and 393 feet west of the point of accident.
Discussion
As No. 11 approaching Naperville, the speed was about 80 miles per hour. The
front brakeman, who was making a running inspection of his train from the right
rear vestibule of the tenth car, saw an unidentified object fly from under the
train, and soon afterward sounded the communicating system signal to stop. The
train was stopped 1-1/2 miles westward about 1:03 p.m., in the vicinity of the
station at Naperville, with the rear end standing 1,850 feet west of the west
end of a 0 degree 49.12'-curve to the right and 934 feet west of automatic
signal 228.1. About 2 minutes later the rear end of No. 11 was struck by No.
39. At this time the train brakes of No. 11 were released; but the brakes on
both Diesel-units were applied.
As No. 11 was approaching Naperville the flagman was stationed in the front end
of the twelfth car, so that he could inspect his train as it moved on the curve
to the right. His flagging equipment was on the rear platform of the rear or
thirteenth car. When the flagman felt the application of the brakes as his
train was preparing to stop at Naperville he proceeded to the rear end of the
train and, after No. 11 stopped, he proceeded to the rear to provide flag
protection. He had reached a point about 300 feet to the rear of his train and
was giving stop signals with a red flag ten the engine of No. 39 passed him. He
said that he was unable to make an inspection of his train from any point to
the rear of the front end of the twelfth car, because of the type of equipment
involved. It had been his experience that fusees dropped from a train moving at
high speed would not remain lighted, and for this reason he said it had not
been his practice to drop lighted fusees from a moving train. In tests after
the accident, lighted 10-minute fusees were dropped from the rear Platform of a
train moving on track No. 2. At speeds in excess of 40 miles per hour, fusees
either bounced off track No. 2 or failed to burn. Burning fusees remained on
track No. when dropped at speeds of 40 miles per hour and lower and continued
to burn. The engineer of No. 11 said that he did not sound the engine-whistle
signal for the flagman to protect the rear of the train until his train had
stopped. The flagman proceeded to the rear immediately to provide flag
protection. He did not operate the switch to light the oscillating red light
which was provided at the rear of the train for giving additional waning. This
device was therefore not operating. The sun was shining and, because of the
curvature of track to the rear of No. 11, there is some question whether the
engineer of No. 39 could have seen the oscillating red light, had it been
lighted, in time to take action to stop his train short of the preceding train.
As No. 39 was approaching Naperville, the speed was about 80 miles per hour.
Both enginemen were in the control compartment at the front end of the first
Diesel-electric unit, and the members of the train crew were in various
locations throughout the cars of the train, the engineer was seriously injured
in the accident and he was unable to make a statement before this investigation
was completed. The fireman jumped from the control compartment of the first
Diesel-electric unit just before the, impact occurred, end he was killed.
Members of the train crew were not aware that anything was wrong until the
collision occurred. Several members of the train crew said they felt a light
service application of the brakes about midway between signals 227.1 and 228.1.
Those employees thought the speed was about 45 miles per hour at the time of
the collision. The brakes of this train had been tested and had functioned
properly en route. In tests of the brake equipment of this train after the
accident, the brakes functioned properly in both service and emergency
applications and the brake-cylinder piston travel was in conformity with the
requirements. The automatic sanding feature of the Diesel-electric units
functioned during emergency application of the brakes after the accident.
Signal 227.1 displayed approach for No 39. Under the rules this indication
required the train to "approach next signal prepared to stop." On most
railroads the indication for an approach signal is "Proceed preparing to stop
at next signal. Train exceeding medium speed must at once reduce to that
speed." This latter indication establishes a definite minimum requirement which
is essential to safe operation and which if it had been followed in this case
would have prevented this accident. On the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Railroad the approach indication is supplemented by a time-table instruction
which provides that when a distant signal is displaying a restricting
indication, trains must reduce seed at once and move at restricted speed until
the indication of the next governing signal can be determined. Under this
instruction, as soon as the approach aspect of signal 227.1 came into view the
speed of No. 39 should have been reduced at once, and the train should have
proceeded prepared to stop short of train, obstruction or anything that the
restricted speed indication was protecting. Had the signal been observed and
this instruction complied with, this accident would have been prevented. Signal
228.1 displayed stop-then-proceed, which indication required that the train
must be stooped and then operated beyond this signal in such manner that it
could be stooped short of a preceding train. The weather was clear and there
was no condition which obscured the view of the aspects displayed by signals
227.1 and 228.1. Signal 227.1 could be seen from the control compartment of No.
39 throughout a distance of not less than 5,000 feet. In tests after the
accident signals 227.1 and 228.1 functioned properly. Examination of
Diesel-electric engine 9910 after the accident disclosed that the automatic
brake valve was in service position. There was no indication that an emergency
application of the brakes had been made. The members of the train crew of No.
39 said that they did not feel any brake application in the vicinity of
aperville until their train was midway between signals 227.1 and 228.1. A
series of braking tests was conducted after the accident, with a train of
similar weight and brake system to No. 39 on the day of the accident. As a
result of 30-pound service brake-pipe reductions made at signal 227.1, the test
train stopped from speeds of 80 and 85 miles per hour short of signal 228.1.
Since it was not possible to question the engineer of No. 39 during this
investigation, it is not known why action was not taken by him to operate No.
39 in accordance with the indications displayed by the signals involved
According to the timetable in effect at the time of the accident, the scheduled
leaving time from Chicago Union Station for Nos. 11 and 39 was 12:35 p.m. The
leaving time for No. 11 from Downer's Grove, 7.32 miles east of Naperville, was
12:56 p.m., and for No. 39, 12:58 p.m. This was close headway. In the operation
of trains under such headway engineers should be especially alert at all times.
In a new timetable, effective May 26, 1946, the scheduled leaving time from
Chicago Union Station for No. 11 is 12:30 p.m., and for No. 39, 12:45 p.m.,
which provides at all times. In a new timetable, effective May 26, 1946, the
scheduled leaving time from Chicago Union Station for No. 11 is 12:30 p.m., and
for No. 39, 12:45 p.m., which provides a time interval of 15 minutes. However,
increased of the time interval between these schedules will riot necessarily
prevent similar accidents, because trains scheduled 15 or more minutes apart at
their initial terminal can close up until a situation develops similar to the
one involved in the accident here under investigation. If an adequate automatic
train-stop or train-control system had been in use end functioning properly,
the speed of No. 39 would have been controlled in accordance with the
conditions of track occupancy ahead, regardless of any inaction on the part of
the engineer, and this accident would have been averted. If a cab-signal system
had been in use and functioning properly, an audible warning signal would have
been sounded, and signal aspects indicating the presence of the train ahead
would have been displayed continuously in the cab in the view of both the
engineer and the fireman, and this accident might have been averted.
There is now pending before the Commission docket No. 29543, which is an
investigation instituted May 20, 1946, on its own motion, to determine whether
it is necessary, in the public interest, to require any common carrier by
railroad to install block signal system, interlocking, automatic train stop,
train control and/or cab signal devices, and/or other similar appliances,
methods and systems intended to promote the safety of railroad operation, upon
the whole or any part of its railroad on which any train is operated at a speed
of 50 or more miles per hour. Hearing therein will be held in the near future.
The thirteenth or rear car of No. 11 was of conventional all-steel
construction, and weighed 10,300 pounds. As a result of direct shock in the
collision, the center-sills were bent downward about 18 inches at the rear end,
and the bend extended to the rear bolster. The first unit of the locomotive of
No. 39 was deflected upward; it entered the rear car above the floor level, and
the superstructure was destroyed about three-fourths the length of the car. As
a result of the upward deflection of the first unit of the locomotive, the
buffing members of the rear car did not receive the full force of thc
collision. A considerable amount of the force was dissipated in the twelfth,
eleventh, tenth and ninth cars. The greatest damage and practically all the
deaths occurred in the thirteenth and eleventh cars. The twelfth car was of
conventions all-steel construction, and weighed 169,800 pounds. It was not
damaged extensively. The eleventh, tenth and ninth cars were of lightweight
construction; and weighed, respectively, 115,800, 112,950, and 110,700 pounds.
The eighth and seventh cars were of conventional all-steel construction, and
weighed, respectively, 139,700 and 141,800 pounds. The eleventh car stopped in
reverse direction. It was bent in an U-shape. The section between the body
bolsters was demolished, and the sections between the body bolsters and the
ends were considerably damaged. The eleventh, tenth and ninth cars were
equipped with tightlock couplers.
Examination of the extent of damage to each of the rear five cars of No. 11
directs attention to the comparative capacities of these cars to withstand
heavy buffing stresses. Specifications for end-to-end buffing stresses for
passenger-train cars were first promulgated In 1912 for railway post office
cars. These specifications required that such cars must be constructed so as to
resist buffing stress of not less than 800,000 pounds, and this requirement has
not been changed. In 1939, the Association of American Railroads recommended to
its members certain specifications, based on the existing Railway Mail Service
specifications, for the construction of passenger cars used in trains of more
than 600,000 pounds light weight. Those specifications, made standard by the
Association of American Railroads in 1945, require that the car structure
resist minimum static end load of 800,000 pounds applied on center line of
draft without developing any permanent deformation in any member of the car
structure. The eleventh car was a dining car built in 1938, and was of
stainless steel construction. The center-sill of this car was of stainless
steel, with a cross-sectional area of 8.38 square inches. This is insufficient
to meet the specifications recommended by the Association of American Railroads
in 1939 and made standard by it in 1945. In recent years similar cars have boon
constructed with stainless steel center-sills having a cross-sectional area of
18 square inches. The cross-sectional areas of the center-sills of the tenth
and ninth cars were about 40 percent greater than that of the eleventh car.
Several railroads have in use a total of about 105 cars of the same
specifications as the eleventh car in No. 11, and about 20 of these are in use
by the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad.
In 1938 the Commission investigated a head-end collision between two passenger
trains in which there were cars of similar specifications to that of the
dinning car of No. 11. In that accident as well as the present one, the first
car of such specifications in the line of travel of the force of collision
received far greater damage than the adjoining cars which were of heavier
construction. In both cases there were cars of heavier construction beyond the
cars in question, and they received only minor damage.
The following recommendation was made in the Commission's report covering
investigation of this 198 accident:
It is recommended that railroad officials give serious consideration to
discontinuance of operation, of so-called lightweight cars between or ahead of
standard, cars unless and until the strength of construction has been
determined by suitable tests to be substantially the same as that of other cars
with which they are associated.
Notwithstanding this recommendation, and also the subsequent action of the
Association of American Railroads establishing a minimum requirement of
resistance to end buffing stresses for cars in unrestricted service, cars which
do not conform to this standard are continued in operation in association with
cars of substantially heavier construction and which meet this minimum
requirement. The number of casualties which resulted in this case may have been
attributable in part to this condition. Only the three lightweight cars were
equipped with tightlock couplers. Had all the cars involved been equipped with
tightlock couplers, and had all cars conformed to the standard for end buffing
resistance, it is probable that the disastrous consequences of this accident
would have been greatly reduced.
Cause
It is found that this accident was caused by failure to operate the following
train in accordance with signal indications.
Recommendation
It is recommended that the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company
discontinue the operation of passenger-train cars which do not meet present
standards, intermingled in trains with cars meeting such standards.
No recommendation is made at this time with respect to the method of
controlling the speed of these fast trains, since this matter is receiving
comprehensive consideration in our docket No. 29543.
Dated at Washington, D. C., this thirtieth day of July, 1946.
By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.
W. P. BARTEL,
(SEAL)
Secretary.
FOOTNOTE:
1 Under authority
of section 17 (2 of the Interstate Commerce Act the above-entitled proceeding
was referred by the Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and
disposition.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Microsearch Document Services
--- In CBQ@yahoogroups.com, "Rupert & Maureen" <gamlenz@...> wrote:
>
> I'm helping Chuck Spinner with research for his book about the 1946
> Naperville crash which involved the Advance Flyer heading for Lincoln and the
> Exposition Flyer going to California. In that connection, can anyone help
> with these queries?
>
>
>
> The Advance Flyer made an unscheduled stop for observation after a trainman
> thought he saw something fly from under the train. Should the engineer have
> sounded his horn when stopping? If so, why didn't he? (It would probably not
> have made any difference but Chuck is curious about this.)
>
> Finally, does anyone know where office car The Round Up is or whether it is
> still in existence? This was the buffet/parlor/solarium observation car #220
> Mississippi which was rebuilt after the crash as The Round Up, was sold by BN
> to Bombardier Ltd. who resold it to Ron Salisbury of Toronto, Canada, in 1972.
>
> Any information would be gratefully received.
>
> Rupert Gamlen
> Auckland NZ
>
> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
>
------------------------------------
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