John
Thanks for that. I only recorded those Reports which were listed as CB&Q,
etc. in the annual lists – I didn’t go looking in the Reports of other roads.
I wouldn’t be surprised if I had missed more than one. They all merged into one
after a short time!
Rupert Gamlen
Auckland NZ
From:
CBQ@yahoogroups.com [mailto:CBQ@yahoogroups.com]
Sent: 17 November 2015 17:00
To: CBQ@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [CBQ] Re: ICC
Accident reports
You
missed at least one. Look for a wreck at Centralia, Illinois in early November,
1928, when the IC Panama Limited hit a Q coal train at the IC interlocker.
From: "'Rupert & Maureen' gamlenz@ihug.co.nz [CBQ]"
<CBQ@yahoogroups.com>
To: CBQ@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Monday, November 16, 2015
9:39 PM
Subject: RE: [CBQ] Re: ICC
Accident reports
Doug
I’ve had a look at the table (and found a couple of spelling errors so a new
table has been uploaded) and counted up the principal causes I previously
recorded in generalised terms. In descending order, they were -
25 failing to comply with orders
11 flagging failure
11 insufficient control
10 excess speed
9 defective orders or non-delivery
8 grade crossings
8 defective wheels, etc.
7 track defects
5 signals not complied with
3 bridge/track washout
3 insufficient brakes set
7 “others”
So, of the 94 or so reported accidents, 27 were due to track, wheel or gear
failures, bridge collapses, grade crossings and snow drifts which were,
generally speaking, beyond the control of the train crew, so flagging failures
were one sixth of the balance.
I think that the whole issue of flagging was fraught with potential danger.
Rule 99 said
99.
When a train stops under
circumstances in which it may be overtaken by another train, the flagman must
go back immediately with flagman's signals a sufficient distance to insure full
protection, placing two torpedoes, and when necessary, in addition, displaying
lighted fusees.
What was a sufficient distance and how were
flagmen to measure it? I have not seen any indication in the reports that
formal training was given to flagmen, nor any guide as to what was considered
“sufficient”. Was there training and/or an instruction book for flagmen showing
minimum stopping distances for trains and how to judge the distance from the
train?
The Rule continues -
When signal 14 (d) or
14 (e) has been given to the flagman and safety to the train will permit, he
may return. When the conditions require he will leave the torpedoes and a
lighted fusee.
Once again, the onus is put on a potentially
junior and inexperienced employee to gauge the safety of the train and to
consider the circumstances. This problem did not arise in 1911 when the ICC
started the investigations. Given the number of accidents since trains started
running where the flagman failed to adequately warn an on-coming train of a
stoppage, one wonders why more was not done to reduce the frequency, rather
than rely on a Rule which placed all the responsibility on the flagman.
Rupert Gamlen
Auckland NZ
From: CBQ@yahoogroups.com [mailto:CBQ@yahoogroups.com]
Sent: 17 November 2015 04:43
To: CBQ@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [CBQ] Re: ICC Accident
reports
I am not surprised at the number of flagging citations. There are
10 accidents out of 96 where flagging failure is reported as the cause, that is
10%. All are in the earlier years, when Timetable and Train orders controlled
the road. One is within yard limits and one was on a work train. I would
suspect many are because the flagman did not got out the required distance, but
rather was short flagging thinking the train would not be stopped that long, or
the flagman positioned himself such that the approaching train did not see him
soon enough, or thinking the stop was momentary a flag was not even sent out.
The yard limit one is intriguing, most likely not clearing in time for a time 1st
class train and did not send out a flagman.
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Posted by: "Rupert & Maureen" <gamlenz@ihug.co.nz>
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