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Rupert You missed at least one. Look for a wreck at Centralia, Illinois in early November, 1928, when the IC Panama Limited hit a Q coal train at the IC interlocker. John From: "'Rupert & Maureen' gamlenz@ihug.co.nz [CBQ]" <CBQ@yahoogroups.com> To: CBQ@yahoogroups.com Sent: Monday, November 16, 2015 9:39 PM Subject: RE: [CBQ] Re: ICC Accident reports Doug
I’ve had a look at the table (and found a couple of spelling errors so a new table has been uploaded) and counted up the principal causes I previously recorded in generalised terms. In descending order, they were - 25 failing to comply with orders 11 flagging failure 11 insufficient control 10 excess speed 9 defective orders or non-delivery 8 grade crossings 8 defective wheels, etc. 7 track defects 5 signals not complied with 3 bridge/track washout 3 insufficient brakes set 7 “others” So, of the 94 or so reported accidents, 27 were due to track, wheel or gear failures, bridge collapses, grade crossings and snow drifts which were, generally speaking, beyond the control of the train crew, so flagging failures were one sixth of the balance. I think that the whole issue of flagging was fraught with potential danger. Rule 99 said 99. When a train stops under circumstances in which it may be overtaken by another train, the flagman must go back immediately with flagman's signals a sufficient distance to insure full protection, placing two torpedoes, and when necessary, in addition, displaying lighted fusees. What was a sufficient distance and how were flagmen to measure it? I have not seen any indication in the reports that formal training was given to flagmen, nor any guide as to what was considered “sufficient”. Was there training and/or an instruction book for flagmen showing minimum stopping distances for trains and how to judge the distance from the train? The Rule continues - When signal 14 (d) or 14 (e) has been given to the flagman and safety to the train will permit, he may return. When the conditions require he will leave the torpedoes and a lighted fusee. Once again, the onus is put on a potentially junior and inexperienced employee to gauge the safety of the train and to consider the circumstances. This problem did not arise in 1911 when the ICC started the investigations. Given the number of accidents since trains started running where the flagman failed to adequately warn an on-coming train of a stoppage, one wonders why more was not done to reduce the frequency, rather than rely on a Rule which placed all the responsibility on the flagman. Rupert Gamlen Auckland NZ From:
CBQ@yahoogroups.com [mailto:CBQ@yahoogroups.com]
Sent: 17 November 2015 04:43 To: CBQ@yahoogroups.com Subject: [CBQ] Re: ICC Accident reports I am not surprised at the number of flagging citations. There are 10
accidents out of 96 where flagging failure is reported as the cause, that is
10%. All are in the earlier years, when Timetable and Train orders controlled
the road. One is within yard limits and one was on a work train. I would
suspect many are because the flagman did not got out the required distance, but
rather was short flagging thinking the train would not be stopped that long, or
the flagman positioned himself such that the approaching train did not see him
soon enough, or thinking the stop was momentary a flag was not even sent out.
The yard limit one is intriguing, most likely not clearing in time for a time 1st
class train and did not send out a flagman.
Doug Harding
__._,_.___ Posted by: "John D. Mitchell, Jr." <cbqrr47@yahoo.com> __,_._,___ |