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Almost all of each sub-division special instructions stated the distance the flagman must go back and it was generally 2 1/2 miles. If a train knew they were going to be stopped in non-signaled territory, they would generally drop the flagman off and he would put down his torpedoes and return to 1/2 of the distance where he would stay until recalled. If he stopped a train, the 2nd train would drop their flagman off and pull up to the way car of the first train. The 2nd train's flagman would go back the required distance and but down torpedoes and return to 1/2 the distance and so forth. The maximum speed in non-signalled territory was 49 MPH. so the 2 1/2 mile rule provided adequate protection. Most accidents were caused by "short flagging" where the flagman was not at the required flagging distance. When a train knew it would be stopping, the rear end crew would drop off lighted 10 minute fusees frequently which would give the flagman some time to get in position. Another cause for collisions was when the head end of the train was in yard limits and the way car was hanging outside of the Y. L. sign. There were several accidents at Barstow on westbound trains that were setting out or picking up and the rear end was "hung out" past the yard limit sign. The system worked as long as everybody did their job and speed restrictions were observed. Bud Linroth. From: "'Rupert & Maureen' gamlenz@ihug.co.nz [CBQ]" <CBQ@yahoogroups.com> To: CBQ@yahoogroups.com Sent: Monday, November 16, 2015 9:39 PM Subject: RE: [CBQ] Re: ICC Accident reports Doug
I’ve had a look at the table (and found a couple of spelling errors so a new table has been uploaded) and counted up the principal causes I previously recorded in generalized terms. In descending order, they were - 25 failing to comply with orders 11 flagging failure 11 insufficient control 10 excess speed 9 defective orders or non-delivery 8 grade crossings 8 defective wheels, etc. 7 track defects 5 signals not complied with 3 bridge/track washout 3 insufficient brakes set 7 “others” So, of the 94 or so reported accidents, 27 were due to track, wheel or gear failures, bridge collapses, grade crossings and snow drifts which were, generally speaking, beyond the control of the train crew, so flagging failures were one sixth of the balance. I think that the whole issue of flagging was fraught with potential danger. Rule 99 said 99. When a train stops under circumstances in which it may be overtaken by another train, the flagman must go back immediately with flagman's signals a sufficient distance to insure full protection, placing two torpedoes, and when necessary, in addition, displaying lighted fusees. What was a sufficient distance and how were flagmen to measure it? I have not seen any indication in the reports that formal training was given to flagmen, nor any guide as to what was considered “sufficient”. Was there training and/or an instruction book for flagmen showing minimum stopping distances for trains and how to judge the distance from the train? The Rule continues - When signal 14 (d) or 14 (e) has been given to the flagman and safety to the train will permit, he may return. When the conditions require he will leave the torpedoes and a lighted fusee. Once again, the onus is put on a potentially junior and inexperienced employee to gauge the safety of the train and to consider the circumstances. This problem did not arise in 1911 when the ICC started the investigations. Given the number of accidents since trains started running where the flagman failed to adequately warn an on-coming train of a stoppage, one wonders why more was not done to reduce the frequency, rather than rely on a Rule which placed all the responsibility on the flagman. Rupert Gamlen Auckland NZ From:
CBQ@yahoogroups.com [mailto:CBQ@yahoogroups.com]
Sent: 17 November 2015 04:43 To: CBQ@yahoogroups.com Subject: [CBQ] Re: ICC Accident reports I am not surprised at the number of flagging citations. There are 10
accidents out of 96 where flagging failure is reported as the cause, that is
10%. All are in the earlier years, when Timetable and Train orders controlled
the road. One is within yard limits and one was on a work train. I would
suspect many are because the flagman did not got out the required distance, but
rather was short flagging thinking the train would not be stopped that long, or
the flagman positioned himself such that the approaching train did not see him
soon enough, or thinking the stop was momentary a flag was not even sent out.
The yard limit one is intriguing, most likely not clearing in time for a time 1st
class train and did not send out a flagman.
Doug Harding
__._,_.___ Posted by: ralph linroth <wcman8@yahoo.com> __,_._,___ |