Re: [CBQ] Naperville crash

["Louis Zadnichek via groups.io" <LZadnichek=aol.com@groups.io>]

August 5, 2025

 

Warren - I'll second and third and fourth......... that.  Leo, your Naperville crash commentary was brilliant and so immensely informative!  The last time I heard the term "running on yellows" was many, many years ago - Louis

 

Louis Zadnichek II

Fairhope, AL

In a message dated 8/5/2025 2:31:10 PM Central Daylight Time, cbq4630=yahoo.com@groups.io writes:

 

Leo, you are an amazing person and even more amazing of your first hand knowledge of Q history in particular!  I could sit and listen to you all day long and never ever ceased to be amazed and not loose my attention!

 

Im honored to know you!

 

Thank you and be well my friend!

 

Warren Hanson

 

On Aug 4, 2025, at 10:33 PM, Leo Phillipp via groups.io <qutlx1=aol.com@groups.io> wrote:

 

Randal,

 

Thank you for your post on the Naperville wreck. It is very well done and professional .

Your site is impressive. But I feel a need to point out some interesting variances.

 

First let me say that I spent 8 years on the BN on the very division this wreck occurred on. Mostly as a brakeman and conductor. I passed on a promotion to engine service and ended my time as an exempt employee at the Chicago regional office. I now have 

Accumulated 48 years in the rail industry and am still working in the industry. I should state that in my earliest days I was an Aurora UTU lodge officer for about 3 years. But I hold no animosity toward the Q, just the opposite is the case. Simply check the BRHS site of officers and then the number of articles I have written for the Bulletin and Zephyrs. Not to mention dozens of presentations made. Let’s move on to some of your post comments.

 

I re-read the ICC report for the umpteenth time this evening. It states that upon inspection the brake valve in the lead locomotive of #39(the following train) was found in the service (applied)position as you sate. Not in the emergency position. Number 39s train crew testimony states they only noted  “a light service application of brakes” between the two signals approaching Naperville. I find it difficult that a “light service application” brought that trains speed from an estimated 80MPH to an estimated 45MPH at impact. You state that later tests showed if the engineer had applied both train and engine brakes the accident would have been avoided.

 

The ICC report  states that a few days after the wreck a test train was operated with similar equipment to #39. An emergency application of the brakes at a point 2,292 feet east of the second signal at Naperville at 86MPH,where the first indication of the red signal could be seen, resulted in the train passing the point of impact by 393 feet. In other words a full emergency application would not have prevented the wreck from that vantage point.It probably would not have been quite at the same impact speed.

 

It is hard to understand that an engineer would not have thrown the brakes into emergency upon seeing the red board and stopped train.The train crews testimony matches the train brake valve position after the wreck?!

 

You state that a defective air hose was found but it was not determined if it had any effect. I cant find anything in the ICC report about a defective air hose. A defective air hose at 14th street yard before departure would have been cause for mechanical department attention before departure . A defective (failed) air hose in route would have caused an emergency brake application or at minimum an unintended brake pipe pressure reduction causing brake application.

 

Did engineer Blaine fail to comply with the exact letter of the rules concerning reaction to signal indications? Yes. Was this practice of “running on yellows” routine experience for these two trains ? Yes.  Why ? As I discussed with one engineer today who pointed out……let’s see its the middle of the afternoon. No dinky parade,minimum freight traffic but we operate 2 high speed passenger trains on the same track with 3 minute headways ? There are 3 mains available!

 

One of the most repeated comments I heard on locomotives, waycars  and in locker rooms in my day was that “the consolidated code is written in blood”. I find it interesting that while every ICC report and RR investigation can quote numerous rule violations on the part of employees it is rare that management specific day to day operations practices setting up the situation are questioned.

 

A last note that I learned in a discussion today with one of the engineers. It is hearsay but like a lot things I heard while on the rails I tend to believe. This engineer shared that another retired engineer,more senior than he,shared that a good source had this to say about engineer Blaine. He had spent his years at Galesburg as an Aurora division man based there. He spent most of his years on the few locals and yard jobs that Aurora div. Men based at Galesburg were entitled to hold. Think things east of Galesburg and west of Mendota or within the Aurora based zone. About a year or so before he was elligible for retirement he decided he wanted to work mainline passenger service. His seniority would allow him to work between C.U.S. And Galesburg. He made training trips and was schooled on the practice of running on yellow boards. 

 

My intention with this response is to shed light not start a fight.

 

Thank you,

 

Leo Phillipp

 

 

On Aug 4, 2025, at 11:46 AM, Randal O'Toole <rot@ti.org> wrote:

 

Hello,

 

The Naperville crash was a turning point in U.S. passenger train history as it led the Interstate Commerce Commission to limit speeds of trains to 79 mph on lines that did not have in-cab signals or some other form of positive train control. Due to ICC orders dating back to the 1920s, most railroads had such signals installed on one or two districts, but no more.

 

Railroads that had faster trains on routes that did not have positive train control were forced to choose between making expensive signal installations or slowing those trains. Only 13,000 miles or 7 percent of U.S. rail lines at the time had such signals installed.  Railroads were running faster trains on another 27,000 miles, and installing the signal systems on all 27,000 miles would have cost more than $100 million (about $1 billion in today's dollars). With passenger ridership rapidly declining, the incentive to make such an investment was low.

 

To compete with the Milwaukee and North Western on the Chicago-Twin Cities route, Burlington installed such signals on part of its route between Chicago and the Twin Cities. But Burlington and UP both decided to add 30 minutes to their Chicago-Denver trains rather than install the signals. Santa Fe installed signals so it could keep the Super Chief and El Capitan on 39-3/4 hour schedules, but Southern Pacific scrapped its plan to turn the Golden State into a 39-3/4-hour train rather than spend the money to install such signals.

 

The sad thing is that if the signals had been installed on the Burlington, they would not have prevented the Naperville crash. It is pretty clear from the ICC report that William Blaine, the engineer of the Expo Flyer, was at fault for the crash. He saw the yellow signal that told him to slow down. Instead of braking, he simply eased off on the throttle, figuring he was just a little closer to the Advance Flyer than the three minutes that was scheduled. This was called "riding the yellow" and though it didn't follow the rules it was a common practice.

 

Blaine's fireman died in the crash. Blaine himself behaved peculiarly after the crash. He had a head injury and after being bandaged he hitched a ride back to Aurora saying he had to catch a train. At Aurora, he was recognized and hospitalized. In the hospital, he told someone that when he saw a red signal he applied the brakes to stop the train. However, when the railroad examined his locomotive, it found that only the train brakes, not the locomotive brakes, had been applied. Tests showed that if Blaine at applied both brakes, the train would have safely stopped. Closer examination revealed a defective brake hose on one of the cars, though investigators could not be sure that the defective hose caused the accident.

 

Four different accident investigations took place, the coroner's report urged that Blaine be charged with manslaughter, and a local DA vowed to prosecute him. Yet Blaine was never formally interviewed after the accident other than the hospital statement. He retired immediately and reading between the lines I suspect he must have suffered a permanent brain injury. 

 

In any case, it seems clear that he saw the yellow signal and made the wrong response or that a defect led the locomotive brakes to fail. Having an in-cab signal would not have helped. But because of that, any progress towards higher-speed trains in America was cut off by the new ICC rule.

 

A somewhat longer version of this email is at https://streamlinermemories.info/?p=358.

 

Randal O'Toole

https://streamlinermemories.info 

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