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This is a very interesting accident report. It is interesting to me for two reasons. One, the IC had almost the same kind of an accident on the "Edgewood Cutoff" in the mid-1950's. In that case, both trains were moving at the time of the wreck. The head end crew of the northbound train ,that was to hold the main line was killed. Trainmaster Roy Cavaness was riding in the caboose of the offending southbound train ! The conductor of that train likewise, pulled the air just at the time of impact when he saw the north siding switch go past the caboose. Second, the "brakeman Traut" (whose first name escapes me) was a brother of Wyburn Traut, longtime trainmaster, and assistant superintendent at Centralia and my old friend. Wyburn was involved in a fatal
accident in this same territory, when he was a fireman, (through no fault of his). The main rod of the engine broke causing a derailment. I heard him tell about both Q wrecks. On Sunday, July 13, 2014 1:57 PM, "LZadnichek@aol.com [CBQ]" <CBQ@yahoogroups.com> wrote: July 13, 2013
Fog and misreading orders were factors in the head-on collision between
CB&Q Class M-4 No. 6325 and Class S-1-A No. 2826 at Omar, CO, on October 27,
1936. The accident occurred during the period when the Class
M-4 locomotives were assigned to regular freight service between Denver,
CO, and Lincoln, NE. No. 6325 was upgraded to a Class M-4-A locomotive at the
West Burlington Shops in September 1935 and ended her service
life on the Galesburg Division being sold for scrap in May 1961. Both
No. 6325 and No. 2826 most likely received heavy repairs from the Omar collision
at the Denver Shops. No. 2826, with an extended smoke box for
burning lignite coal, is shown assigned to the McCook Division in 1935
and worked out her service life on Lines West being sold for scrap in April
1951. Best Regards - Louis
Louis Zadnichek II
Fairhope, AL
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Inv-2107
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR BUREAU OF SAFETY
ACCIDENT ON THE CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD
OMAR, COLO.
OCTOBER 27, 1936
INVESTIGATION NO. 2107
SUMMARY
Railroad: Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy
Date: October 27, 1936
Location: Omar, Colo.
Kind
of accident: Head-end collision
Trains
involved: Freight : Passenger
Train
numbers: Extra 6325 : No. 301
Engine
numbers: 6325 : 2826
Consist: 30 cars and caboose : 10 cars
Speed: Standing : 20 miles per hour
Track: 1 degree curve to the right, 0.6
percent descending grade for eastward trains
Weather: Foggy
Time: 5:40 a.m.
Casualties: 18 injured
Cause: Failure to obey a meet order
December
11, 1936
To
the Commission:
On
October 27, 1936, there was a head-end collision between a passenger train and a
freight train on the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad at Omar, Cob.,
which resulted in the injury of 12 passengers, 1 mail clerk, 1 Pullman porter
and 4 employees.
Location
and method of operation
This
accident occurred on the Akron and Denver Subdivision of the McCook Division
which extends between Akron and Denver, Cob., a distance of 111.42 miles; in the
vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains
are operated by timetable, train orders, ad an automatic block-signal system.
The passing track at Omar is 3,992 feet in length, paralleling the main track on
the south, and the accident occurred at a point 167 feet east of the east switch
of this passing track. Approaching the point of the accident from the east, the
track is tangent for a distance of 9,493 feet, followed by a 1 degree curve to
the left 636 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve about 163 feet
from its western end. Approaching from the west the track is tangent for 10,687
feet, followed by the curve on which the accident occurred. The grade for
east-bound trains is descending, and is 0.6 percent at the point of
accident.
At
a point about 117 feet east of the east passing-track switch are located two
automatic block signals; the single arm signal on the south side of the track is
known as the starting signal for east-bound trains and the 2-arm signal directly
opposite on the north side of the track is the home signal for west-bound
trains; there are similar signals just west of the west switch.
The
weather was very foggy at the time of the accident, which occurred about 5:40
a.m.
Description
Extra
6325, an east-bound freight train, consisted of 30 cars and a caboose, hauled by
engine 6325, and was in charge of Conductor Challstrom and Engineman Lowman.
This train arrived at Hudson, 28.84 miles west of Omar, at 4:10 a.m., where the
crew received a copy of train order 31, form 19, directing Train No. 3 to wait
at Wiggins until 4:57 a.m. and at Omar until 5:02 a.m. for Extra 6325; their
also received train order 33, form 19, directing Train No. 301 to wait at
Vallery until 5:15 a.m. and at Wiggins until 5:25 a.m. for Extra 6325, both of
these stations being east of Omar. Extra 6325 departed from Hudson, the last
open office, at 4:18 a.m., according to the train sheet, and a stop was made at
Crest, 5.05 miles west of Omar, on account of being unable to reach Omar for
Train No. 3 on the time given in the order. Conductor Challstrom called the
dispatcher on the telephone and received train order 49, form 19, directing his
train to meet Train No. 301 at Omar and Train No. 67 at Wiggins. Extra 6325
departed from Crest, but instead of heading in on passing track at Omar to meet
Train No. 301, it continued on the main line, and had just been stopped east of
the east switch when it was struck by Train No. 301.
Inv.
No. 2107 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy RR, Omar, Colorado Oct. 27, 1936
Train
No. 301, a west-bound passenger train, consisted of 1 baggage car, 1 combination
baggage and mail car, 1 coach, 1 Pullman sleeping car, 1 chair car, 1 coach, 1
Pullman tourist sleeping car, 1 dining car, and 2 Pullman sleeping cars, in the
order named, hauled by engine 2826, and was in charge of Conductor Lawler and
Engineman Uhl. All of the cars were of steel construction with the exception of
the baggage car, which was of steel construction. At Brush, 29.33 miles east of
Omar, the crew received train order 33, form 19, referred to above, and on
arriving at Wiggins, 5.21 miles east of Omar, at 5:29 a.m., they received train
order 49, also on form 19, Train No. 301 departed from Wiggins at 5:30 a.m., 28
minutes late, and collided with Extra 6325 just east of Omar while traveling at
a speed estimated to have been between 20 and 25 miles per hour.
The
front end of engine 6325 was badly damaged, and the fourth and fifth cars were
turned over on the south side of the track. The rear end of engine 2826, of
Train No. 301, was raised enough to permit its tender to slide under it, the
entire engine stopping in an upright position on top of the tender; the engine
was badly damaged at each end and the tender cistern also was badly damaged; one
pair of wheels of the baggage car was de railed. The engineman, fireman and head
brakeman of Train No. 301, and the fireman of Extra 6325, were the employees
injured.
Summary
of evidence
Engineman
Lowman, of Extra 6325, stated that when leaving Denver the weather was very
foggy and that he could see possibly one-quarter of a mile, but at no time could
he see the rear of the train; the fog was much heavier at Hudson than at Denver.
After stopping at Crest, the head brakeman came to the engine with train order
49, which provided for meets at Omar and at Wiggins, and he hung the order on
the clip where it could be reached, but did not hand it to the fireman as
required by the rules. The brakeman when giving him the order said they were
meeting Trains Nos. 301 and 67 at Wiggins, and Engineman Lowman had a similar
understanding, although he said he read the order three times, including reading
it aloud to the fireman and the brakeman. The fog by this time was so dense that
he could not see signals more than 100 feet distant; on approaching Omar a
caution signal was encountered at the signal near the west switch, at which time
the speed was nearly 50 miles per hour, and he made a service application of the
brakes, bringing the train to a stop about 35 feet east of the signal near the
east switch, which was in stop position; he thought he had been stopped about 10
or 15 seconds when the accident occurred. Engineman Lowman said he thought it
was safe to operate his train in a dense fog at a speed of 50 miles per hour as
long as he could see the signal indications.
Fireman
Jackson, of Extra 6325, corroborated the engineman's statement to the effect
that when the head brakeman got on the engine at Crest and handed Engineman
Lowman the order he told the engineman they were to meet both of the trains at
Wiggins. The engineman did not show him the order, but hung it on the clip, and
being busy he did not look at it until about 10 minutes after the accident
occurred; when he read it the order was clear, although the words were run a
little close together. Fireman Jackson stated he was busy with the fire at Omar
when the engineman applied the air brakes and cabled to the brakeman that
someone was coming, and to get a fusee; Brakeman Traut got the fusee, jumped off
and ran out infront of their engine.
Head
Brakeman Traut, of Extra 6325, stated that he personally read train order 49,
received at Crest and handed to him by Flagman Raub near the caboose; he did not
have any conversation with the conductor about the contents of the order or
receive any instructions to head in at Omar. After reading the order he was
under the impression they were to meet Trains Nos. 301 and 67 at Wig ins, the
reason for this being the fact that Wiggins was the most distinct word in the
order, and that the two words "Omar and" were improperly spaced, and he also
said he thought the conductor might have started to write "and", hut blurred it
and then wrote it a second time. He delivered the order to Engineman Lowman with
the remark that "we have a meet with 301 and 67," and was positive that he did
not specify any station. On leaving Crest he rode on the left side of the cab,
was unable to determine the speed of the train approaching Omar, and did not see
the signals at the west end, and when the engineman applied the brakes he
crossed over to the engineman's side, in the gangway, and he said the train was
nearly stopped when he saw the signal in stop position at the east end of the
passing track, and immediately afterward he saw the headlight of the engine on
Train No. 301. As his train came to a stop he secured a fusee, lighted it and
ran forward, and was about two car lengths in front of the engine when the
collision occurred; he was not positive that the fusee signal was answered,
although he thought that was the case. Head Brakeman Traut stated that he did
not know he had misread the meet order until after the accident.
Conductor
Challstrom, of Extra 6325, stated that before leaving Denver, he had an
understanding with Engineman Lowman that they would stop at Hudson to inspect
the train, on account of there being a very heavy fog, but nothing was said
about the speed at which the train should he run. The stop was made at Hudson
and the train inspected, and the next stop was at Crest, where they headed in to
meet Train No. 3. While at Crest he called the dispatcher and received train
order 49, but made only one copy of this order, the original, which he handed to
the flagman, who read it end gave it to the head brakeman to deliver to the
engineman; he saw the flagman and head brakeman reading the order and there was
no doubt in his mind that they both understood the order. He did not make a wire
report to the dispatcher about the weather conditions, as required by special
instructions in the timetable, but did have a conversation over the telephone
from Crest about it, saying the fog was so dense that they could see only 2 or 3
car lengths between Crest and Omar he and the flagman were in the cupola of the
caboose, looking for a land mark, and were from 3 to 8 car lengths from the
signal at the west end of Omar when he became aware of the fact they were going
to run past their meeting point, and he applied the brakes just as the flagman
called to him about the signal; he could not tell whether he or the engineman
was the first to apply the brakes.
Flagman
Raub, of Extra 6325, stated that Conductor Challstrom handed him train order 49
at Crest and said "we have a meet with 301 at Omar and 67 at Wiggins." He then
read the order, which was clear to him, after which he gave it to the head
brakeman. When the train pulled off the siding at Crest he opened and closed the
switch, and between Crest and Omar he was in the cupola of the caboose; he
estimated the speed of the train between these two points at 40 miles per hour
and said he could not see over one car length. When coming into Omar he saw the
home signal and called their location to the conductor, who at the same moment
applied, the brakes.
Engineman
Uhl, of Train No. 301, stated that he could see about 70 car lengths at Wiggins,
but from Wiggins westward the fog increased and seemed to come in sheets, with
the result that he was making no effort to make running time. The signal about 2
miles east of Omar was clear and could be seen about 3,000 feet, and he
estimated his speed at 25 miles per hour on passing this signal. As they
approached the curve east of Omar the fireman said he saw a headlight burning,
but Engineman Uhl thought Extra 6325 had not yet pulled entirely into clear. He
closed the throttle as they reached the curve and the fireman said the headlight
was still burning; the engineman then made a service application of the brakes,
at which time they were well around the curve, where he could see the headlight,
and the fireman again called, saying that the opposing train was on the main
track, and he then placed the brake valve in emergency position, both he and the
fireman jumping off just as the collision occurred. Engineman Uhl stated he
could have stopped if he had applied the brakes when the fireman first told him
there was a headlight ahead. The fireman did not mention anything about the
signal being in stop position, nor did he ask the fireman about the position of
the signal, and he was expecting to stop at the west switch. He estimated the
speed at the time of the collision at 20 miles per hour.
Fireman
Hodgkin, of Train No. 301, stated that shortly after Engineman Uhl whistled for
the meeting point at Omar he looked out for a signal but was unable to see
anything, the fog being very dense. After getting on the curve just east of Omar
he thought he saw a change in the fog, the glare of a headlight suddenly
appeared and he called to the engineman, who applied the brakes at once, and
told him that there was a red light, that the opposing train was on the main
line, and to get off. The red light he had seen was the fusee held by the
brakeman of Extra 6325; he did not see the indication of the automatic signal
near the east switch.
Dispatcher
Gasch, who issued the train orders involved, said he had been advised by
Conductor Challstrom that there was a heavy fog and that it was getting bad,
also by the operator at Hudson, who said they had thought it best to stop and
inspect the train as the engineman could not see signals. At that time he did
not know the weather conditions eastward and supposed the fog was just around
Hudson, but later, when he put out the meet order between Extra 6325 and Trains
Nos. 301 and 67, he asked the operator at Ft. Morgan, east of Omar, if there was
any fog and was told it was not bad, but Conductor Challstrorn, at Crest, said
the fog was very bad; he did not, however, issue a fog order as required by the
rules when fogs or storms are reported to him; an order of this character reads
as follows: "Fog or storms reported between ---------- and --------------."
Discussion
Under
the provisions of train order 49, Extra 6325 was required to take siding and
meet Train No. 301 at Omar; the engineman and head, brakeman misread the meet
order, however, both making the same mistake, while the fireman did not read the
order until after the accident. The order was poorly written by the conductor,
but it was not in such condition as to justify any one in misreading it if
proper care in reading orders was exercised. The evidence is conflicting as to
the exact location of Extra 6325 at the time the brakes were applied; in fact,
it is impossible to say definitely from the record whether they were first
applied by the engineman from the engine or the conductor from the caboose. From
the engineman's statement, however, it would appear that the brakes were applied
about the time the engine passed the restrictive signal indication at the west
end of Omar, but that the engineman was unable to stop his train before passing
the stop signal at the east end of Omar. Engineman Lawman was an experienced
employee, knew the locations of these signals, and was fully cognizant of the
fact that his view was very materially restricted by the dense fog which existed
at the time, and he should have so controlled the speed of his train that, upon
receiving a restrictive signal indication, he could have stopped before passing
the succeeding signal in the stop position, although, under the circumstances in
this particular case, there is no positive assurance that the accident would
have been prevented even had he brought his train to a stop at that signal.
The
rules provide that the engineman show train orders to his fireman and sound the
meeting point whistle signal at least 1 mile before reaching the meeting point,
and if such signal is not given, the conductor is required to take immediate
action to stop the train; the rule also provide that when fogs, storms or other
conditions obscure the view of track or signals, speed of trains must be reduced
to permit strict observance of signals and insure absolute safety, regardless of
time, and that extra-ordinary precaution must be taken, both at switches and at
all places. where the right to proceed depends upon signals; also that when fog
or storms are reported, dispatchers will give trainmen and enginemen
notification of same by train order. None of these rules was obeyed; the
engineman did not show the order to the fireman, but put it on a clip, while the
conductor did not take action to stop the train until the caboose had
practically reached the switch where the train should have taken the aiding; in
addition, the speed had been nearly 50 miles per hour, according to the
engineman, when passing that switch, although signals could not be seen more
than 100 feet. It also is noted that the conductor made but one copy of train
order 49, not having a copy in his possession at the time of the accident.
Conclusion
This
accident was caused by failure to obey a meet order.
Respectfully
submitted,
W.
J. PATTERSON,
Director.
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- - - __._,_.___ Posted by: "John D. Mitchell, Jr." <cbqrr47@yahoo.com> __,_._,___ |